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JURISDICTION

The Utah Cour t: of Appeals filed its opinion on February

15, 1989 (Appendix A).

The Court denied Mr. Arroyo's Peti-

tion for Rehearing on March 22, 1989 (Appendix B).

The

Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for Writ of Certiorari had to be filed.

This Petition

for Writ of Certiorari is therefore timely filed with this
Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
Ann.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-2-2(5) (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary of Proceedings Below.
Petitioner, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was arrested and
charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute for Value in violation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended).
After a preliminary hearing, the Petitioner was bound over
to the District Court on the narcotics charge.

Arroyo moved

to suppress the evidence asserting that his stop by a highway patrol trooper for the traffic violation of "Following
Too Closely" was a pretext stop.

The trial court granted

the Motion to Suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Suppressing the evidence on
January 6, 1989.

A copy of the Findings of Fact, Con-

clusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Appendix C.
3

The State of Utah appealed the trial court's suppression
order.
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.

The court

held that:
1. The trial judge's determination that
the stop of Arroyo's vehicle was an unconstitutional pretext to search for
drugs was a correct determination because a reasonable officer would not
have stopped Arroyo for "Following Too
Closely" except for some unarticulated
suspicion of more serious criminal activity;
2. Arroyo, through his counsel, stipulated that he had consented to the
search of his vehicle and based upon
misleading conduct by Arroyo's counsel,
said stipulation also included that the
consent was given voluntarily;
3. Although the original illegal stop
was unconstitutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary consent purged the taint
from the initial illegality, and the
Motion to Suppress was therefore improperly granted.
Mr. Arroyo petitioned for rehearing on the basis that:
1) the record clearly demonstrated that Arroyo's counsel did
not stipulate that Arroyo had either consented or voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle; 2) the trial
judge never reached any legal conclusions on the voluntariness of the consent; and 3) even assuming that Arroyo volun4

tarily consented to the search of his vehicle, the State did
not establish a break in the causal connection between the
initial illegal pretext stop and the evidence subsequently
obtained.

The Petition was denied without comment and with-

out addressing that the Court of Appeals' decision had been
based upon the erroneous conclusion that Arroyo's counsel
had mislead the trial Court and the State by stipulating
that Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle. Mr.
Arroyo seeks review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
on these same issues.
B. Pertinent Facts.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 1987, Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, was driving home
after completing his shift an hour earlier.

Trooper

Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah,
when he observed a northbound truck-camper allegedly following the car in front of it too closely.

Trooper Mangelson

executed a U-turn through the median and caught up with
Arroyo's truck.
Trooper Mangelson claimed that the truck was following
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of three to eight
car lengths at a speed of approximately 50 mph.

Trooper

Mangelson pulled along side the truck in order to observe
5

its occupants and estimate the truck's speed.

Trooper

Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his passenger were hispanic,
and that the vehicle had out of state license plates.
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "Following Too
Closely" and for Driving on an Expired Driver's License.
Trooper Mangelson then requested permission to search the
truck, and Arroyo agreed.
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel.

Trooper Mangelson

then arrested Arroyo for possession of a control substance
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1986), second degree
felony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL STIPULATED THAT ARROYO HAD CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE IS CONTRARY TO THE
RECORD AND IS THEREFORE A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Before the trial court, Petitioner's counsel erroneously challenged only the propriety of Arroyo's initial stop.
The additional issues of the 1) voluntariness of Arroyo's
consent and 2) the question of whether the government could
establish a break in the causal connection between a pretext

6

stop and the evidence obtained from the "consent" should
also have been addressed at the suppression hearing.

How-

ever, counsel's oversight in this regard was precisely
that—an oversight.

No devious intent was conjured or con-

templated by Petitioner's counsel.

Instead, Petitioner's

counsel incorrectly believed that the trial court's inquiry
ended with the determination of whether Trooper Mangelson's
stop of Mr. Arroyo was unconstitutional.

Although State v.

Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), has instructed
counsel that a search conducted pursuant to a voluntary
consent can purge the taint from a prior illegal stop, that
case had not been decided until after the suppression hearing held in the lower court.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court's
order of suppression, based its decision at least in part
upon the erroneous interpretation of the record that Arroyo,
through his counsel, had stipulated that Arroyo had consented to the search.

The Court of Appeals misconstrued the

facts when it concluded that Arroyo's counsel had entered
into such a stipulation.
At the suppression hearing, the State's counsel
endeavored to probe the question of whether Arroyo's "consent" was voluntary.

Arroyo's counsel objected on the basis
7

that the only relevant issue was whether the original stop
was a pretext. Admittedly, counsel was in error. Nevertheless, the trial court agreed and sustained the objection.
However, Arroyo's counsel did not at that time stipulate
that Arroyo had consented to the search of the vehicle.

In

fact, the only representation made in that regard was made
by the State's counsel, and not Arroyo's counsel.

The

colloquy was as follows:
Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle.
asked for a driver's license. I made as many
observations about the vehicle as I could.

I

Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney): Describe what you observed. Answer: I observed . . .
Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think I
would object to any further inquiry at this point.
My motion only goes to the propriety and the lawfulness of the stop. And I think that is what . .
The Court:
Mr Eyre:

Was this a consent search?

Yes, sir.

The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes
strictly to the stop.
Mr. Eyre: O.k.
Question: Anything else about
the stop that you recall that you have not previously testified to? Answer: I don't believe
so.
Page 40, transcript of Suppression Hearing.

Thus, the record discloses that it was Mr. Eyre, the

8

Juab County Attorney, who asserted to the trial court that
the search was a consent search.

By ruling that Arroyo's

counsel stipulated that Arroyo consented to the search, the
Court of Appeals committed manifest error.

This was com-

pounded when the Court of Appeals decided to punish the
defendant because his counsel allegedly mislead the State
and the court by "stipulating that consent was given and
then preventing the State from exploring the circumstances
of the consent."

The Court of Appeals concluded that the

appropriate sanction for this alleged misconduct was to find
a fact and a conclusion of law for this first time on appeal.

That is to say, the Court of Appeals found the fact

of consent based upon a stipulation which the record demonstrates was never entered into.

Moreover, to punish coun-

sel, the Court of Appeals also held both factually and as a
conclusion of law that the consent was voluntarily given.
The record is devoid of any facts to support this legal conclusion.
The Court of Appeals also placed special significance
on the trial court's Finding of Fact 18.

That Finding of

Fact states "the trooper requested permission to search the
Defendant's vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the
search of the vehicle."

Based on this Finding of Fact, the
9

Court of Appeals stated, "the trial judge specifically found
that Arroyo consented to the search of his truck, and there
was nothing in the record to contradict this finding."

By

this statement, the Court of Appeals seems to have concluded
that the trial court considered the consent issue.

It did

not.
Because both Arroyo's counsel and the trial court
erroneously believed that evidence which would not have been
discovered "but for" the prior illegal stop was per se
inadmissable, absolutely no facts were presented in connection with the consent issue.

The trial court found nothing

more in Finding of Fact 18 than that Trooper Mangelson
requested permission to search Arroyofs truck and Arroyo
agreed or consented.

The record contains no findings to

support a conclusion of voluntary consent.
Sierra, 754. P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

See State v.
The trial court

entered no conclusions of law concerning either consent or
the voluntariness of that consent.

POINT II:
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED BOTH THE
CONSENT ISSUE AND THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONSENT
ISSUE CONTRARY TO ITS DECISION IN STATE V. SIERRA, 754
P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The case at bar is not unlike Sierra, supra.
10

In

Sierra, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the
trial court to make sufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law on whether 1) Sierra's consent was voluntary and 2) whether the evidence was procured by exploitation of the primary illegality or instead was obtained by
means sufficiently distinguishable from the initial illegal
stop.

In Sierra a remand was ordered because so many fac-

tual issues were unresolved and undeveloped in the record:
The State has the burden of proving that
Sierra's consent was, in fact voluntarily given. Bumper v. State, 391 U.S.
543, 548, 88S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d
797 (1968). The record below merely
indicates that, according to Officer
Smith, Sierra offered to let him search
the trunk of the car. The record contains no facts indicating Sierra consented to Officer Smith's search of the
interior of the car, where he discovered
the incriminating evidence. Nor does
the record reveal exactly how Officer
Smith went from searching the trunk of
the car to searching the passenger side
of the interior; how Officer Smith came
to searching underneath the car and
looking at the gas tank; how Officer
Smith retrieved the keys to the car to
verify the gas level reading; nor how
Sierra responded, if at all, to Officer
Smith's conduct. A translator was required for Sierra at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, which supports his
claim that he had difficulty communicating with Officer Smith. The district
court did not find that Sierra's consent
was voluntary nor did it find that the
evidence procured was not obtained by
the officers' "exploitation of [the pri11

mary illegality]" and "sufficiently distinguishable" from the initial illegal
stop.
(Emphasis supplied, Id. at 981).
In the instant matter these same deficiencies in the
record exist.

Because Arroyo's counsel and the trial court

incorrectly applied a "but for" test, no facts were presented in connection with the consent issues.

The consent

and the attenuation issues are separate and distinct:

By definition, then, Fourth Amendment
"voluntarines" necessarily requires a
finding by the district court that the
evidence was obtained freely and not by
police "exploitation of [the primary]
illegality . . . Wong Sun, supra 371
U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, making
the two findings mutually exclusive.
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141,
1150 (10th Cir. 1986). (Emphasis supplied) .

The omission in this regard does not justify a reversal;
instead, a remand is appropriate.

The Petitioner submits

that just as in Sierra this case should be remanded to the
trial court for a further determination of both the voluntary consent and the attenuation of taint issues.
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POINT III: THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
THE VOLUNTARY CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER NECESSARILY
ESTABLISHED A BREAK IN THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
THE ILLEGAL PRETEXT STOP AND THE EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY
OBTAINED IS IN CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED LAW.
Even if it is assumed, contrary to the record, that the
trial court did consider the consent issue, the
admissibility of the challenged evidence cannot be correctly
decided unless the trial court found from the evidence a
break in the chain of illegality.

In order to admit the

challenged evidence, the trial court must have entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Arroyo's consent was his free and voluntary act.

However, in the in-

stant matter, this issue was never reached by the trial
court.

Rather, the Court of Appeals entered this Finding of

Fact for the first time on appeal as a punishment for what
the Court of Appeals perceived to have been inappropriate
conduct by Petitioner's counsel.

Yet even if there was a

voluntary consent by Arroyo, the record is still devoid of
any Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law on the issue of
whether the State established a break in the causal connection between the illegal pretext stop and the drugs
subsequently obtained in the search of the vehicle.

The

Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that such a Finding of

13

Fact and Conclusion of Law had been made by the trial court
when none in fact had been made.

Finding of Fact 18 does

not support a conclusion of law on the voluntariness of the
consent•
The Court of Appeals' assumption that a voluntary consent necessarily vitiates or attenuates the taint of a prior
illegal stop is contrary to the decisional law which has
developed on this point.

Indeed, the Arroyo decision con-

tradicts the Court of Appeals own decision to remand in
Sierra.

Notwithstanding a finding of voluntary consent,

courts have frequently held that the State has not carried
its burden to purge the primary illegality of the Wong Sun
taint.
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1982), a suspect's
consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by his illegal detention and was ineffective to justify the search of
his two suitcases.

Royer was approached at an airport by

detectives who asked for his airline ticket and driver's
license.

Without returning the ticket and license the de-

tectives asked Royer to accompany them to a small room.
After obtaining Royerfs luggage from the airline without his
consent, he then produced a key and unlocked one suitcase.
Drugs were found in that suitcase.
14

Royer then indicated to

the detectives that he did not know the
lock of the second suitcase.

combination to the

When asked if he objected to

the detective opening the suitcase, Royer said, "no, go
ahead," and did not object when the detective further
explained the suitcase might have to be pried open.

The

trial court concluded that Royerfs

consent to the search

was "freely and voluntarily given".

The Florida District

Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that "at the time his
consent to search was obtained, he was unlawfully confined
and consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted
by the unlawful confinement." 460 U.S. at 495.

The Florida

Court of Appeals held that because there was no proof in a
"break in a chain of illegality" the consent was invalid as
a matter of law.

In affirming the suppression order, the

United States Supreme Court stated:
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally
detained when he consented to the search of his
luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by
the illegality . . .
Id at 507.
The Respondent submits that the same reasoning applies
in the instant matter.

Once the conclusion is reached that

the Respondent was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlaw-
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fully detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the
instant matter has the same burden that the State in Florida
v. Royer, was unable to sustain.
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1981), an informant contacted the DEA and provided information that a person was selling heroin from a particular
motel room.

The informant furnished the DEA with a descrip-

tion of the individual.

The DEA contacted the motel clerk

and confirmed that the defendant matched the description
provided by the informant.

The clerk advised the DEA that

the defendant was expecting a package.

When the package

arrived, the motel clerk contacted the DEA.

The package had

been damaged, and when the DEA agent was handling the package, it broke open and a bindle fell out.
positive for heroin.
on the package.

Additionally,

The bindle tested

a trained dog altered

A search warrant was then obtained and most

of the contents of the package were seized.

However, the

defendant was permitted to pick up the package with some of
its contents still intact.

As soon as the defendant took

possession of the package he was arrested.

Permission was

then requested to search his vehicle and a room in a different motel. The defendant executed written consent forms.
Opium was found in both locations.
16

On appeal, the issue

presented was whether the defendant's post-arrest consent
w^s a sufficiently independent act to avoid the exclusion of
the opium.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that even assuming

the consent was voluntary, "the evidence must nonetheless be
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct was not sufficiently attenuated from the subsequent seizure to avoid
exclusion of the evidence . . . "

The Respondent submits

that the same should hold true in the instant matter.

Even

assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint
from the prior unlawful pretext stop.

In Taheri the gover-

nment was unable to carry its burden:
The government, which bears the burden of showing
admissibility in these circumstances . . . points
to no intervening events or lapse of time which
would show Taheri's consent was sufficiently an
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion.
Id at 601.
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was
inadmissible.
Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th
Cir. 1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law
on the undisputed facts of the record, that Gooding's illegal seizure tainted all that ensued in the investigative

17

encounter, and that his consent to the initial search, even
if voluntary, did not vitiate the taint."
Gooding court suppressed the evidence.

Id at 84.

The

The Court held as

follows:
The connection between the illegal seizure and the
consent—all occurring within the same brief,
continuous encounter--was not sufficiently attenuated to remove the former's taint from the
ultimate fruits of a search.
Id at 84.
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.
1985), the Court focused upon the question of whether the
consent to search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and
detention of the Defendant.

In Recalde, the District Court

held that the consent was knowing and voluntary.

In the

instant matter, there was no such finding.
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defendant 's consent and by not considering whether he had been
unlawfully seized, the Recalde court concluded that the
District Court had misapplied the Supreme Court decisions
governing the issues.

Id at 1457.

"The Court therefore did

not make its finding in light of the requirement that such
consent be free from the taint of the illegal detention.
Because of this, and because of the illegal nature of
Recaldefs seizure and detention are critical, we conclude

18

that the District Court's finding of consent is
erroneous."

Id at 1458.

clearly

Thus, notwithstanding that Recalde

executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and detention. The Respondent submits that the same conclusion will
be borne out by the evidence in the instant matter.
Finally, in State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La.
1978), the Louisiana Court was confronted with the same
issue of assuming the post-arrest consent after an illegal
arrest, was the consent a product of free will rather than
exploitation of the prior illegal arrest.

In deciding this

issue, the Court held, "we think that the uncontradicted
evidence clearly shows that the defendant's "consent" for
the officers to search his residence was coerced through
their exploitation of the immediately preceding illegal
arrest and unconstitutional search of his vehicle.

Id at

191.
The Petitioner submits that all of these cases support
the proposition that even assuming a voluntary consent, a
determination must still be made whether the consent was a
product of the prior illegal stop.

In the instant matter,

for the reasons already stated, no such determination was
ever made by the trial court.
19

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo respectfully requests that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted
and that the matter be remanded to the trial court for a
Sierra hearing on the consent and attenuation issues,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /'" day of Muiuh, 1989.

WALTER Y( BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, this

day of March, 1989 to:

Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Sandra Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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State v. Arroyo
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Marveon previously moved for dismissal on this
very ground. That motion was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court before the case was transferred to
this court. We are not inclined to disturb the
Supreme Court's disposition of this issue and reject
Marveoo's jurisdictional challenge. See Coader v.
A.L. Williams A Assoc*., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
3. On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rule
that is employed in connection with insurance policies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is
construed in favor of coverage. Sec, e.g., Fuller v.
Director of Finance; 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
1985) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be
provided by the policy/); Williams v. First Colony
Life IDS. CO., 593 PJd 534, 536 (Utah 1979)
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life IDS. CO.,
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 <1968) (no
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an
insured). See also Colard v. American Family MuL
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence,
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American
Excess Ins. Co. v. MOM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurant* contracts are
construed to accomplish the object of providing
indemnity to the insured); Wddon v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89,
91 (1985) ('When an ambiguity exists, the court
must construe the policy so as to sustain indemnity.*).
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit language dearly indicating an intent to provide coverage
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the
question of whether such coverage was intended.
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather
than by invoking the stria construction rule. See
generally Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 p.2d
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
•.

Joae Francisco ARROYO,
Defendant and Respondent.
No.S80062-CA
FILED: February 15,1989
Fourth District,'Juab County
Honorable Ray M. Harding «
ATTORNEYS:
David L. Wilkinson and Sondra L. Sjogren,
, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Walter F. Bugdca, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Respondent
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
The State of Utah filed an interlocutory appeal
challenging the district court's suppression of
cocaine seized after a Utah Highway trooper
stopped Jose Francisco. Arroyo ("Arroyo") for an
alleged traffic violation. The trial court found the
Jtor> of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which
violated Arroyo's fourth amendment rights. We
reverse.
FACTS
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15,
1987, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mangebon ("Trooper Mangdson") was driving home
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper
Mangeison was driving southbound on 1-15 near
Nephi, Utah, when be observed a northbound
truck-camper following the car in front of it too
closely. Trooper Mangeison made a U-turn
through the median and caught up with Arroyo's
truck.
Trooper Mangdson observed that the truck was
following the vehicle in front of him at a distance
of three to eight car lengths at a speed of approximately fifty miles per hour. Trooper Mangeison
pulled alongside the truck in order to observe its
occupants and estimate the truck's speed.
Trooper Mangdson noted that Arroyo and his
passenger were Hispanic, and he stopped the
truck.
Arroyo, the driver, was dted for "following too
dosdy* and for driving on an expired driver's
license. Trooper Mangdson then asked Arroyo if
he could search his truck, and Arroyo agreed.
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door pand.
Trooper Mangeison then arrested Arroyo for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837-«<lXa)(D (1906), a second degree felony.
Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine claiming
Trooper Mangdson's traffic stop was a pretext to
search his truck for evidence of a more serious
crime. The trial court found no traffic violation
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangdson's
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to investigate a vehicle lie found suspicious because of outof-state license plates and Hispanic occupants.
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the
subsequent search of his truck, but nevertheless,
granted the motion to suppress. The State
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial
court erred in ruling that Trooper Mangdson's
stop of Arroyo for "following too dosdy" was a
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo's subsequent consent to, the search of his truck purged the
Uimofthcotherwiseuiwxmstitutionalstop.1
The trial court's factual evaluation underlying
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
wffl not be disturbed unless it is dearly erroneous.
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since the trial judge is in the best position to
assess the witnesses' credibility. Stale v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
However, in reviewing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon those findings, we afford
no deference and apply a correction of error standard. Gates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah
1988).
PRETEXT STOP
We first consider whether Trooper Mangelson's
stop of Arroyo's truck was incident to a lawful
stop for a traffic violation or was a constitutionally defective 'pretext* stop. A police officer may
stop a vehicle for a traffic violation committed in
the officer's presence. Nevertheless, a police
officer may not 'use a misdemeanor arrest as a
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious
crime/ Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. Courts must look
to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a stop for a traffic violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext. This involves "an objective, assessment of the officer's actions in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting him at
the time/ Id. The actual state of mind of the
officer at the time of the challenged action is irrelevant. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472
U.S. 463 (1985)). Thus, in this appeal, the question is whether a reasonable officer, in view of
the totality of the circumstances of this case,
would have stopped Arroyo for "following too
closely/ The proper focus is not on whether
Trooper Mangelson could have validly made the
stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
Trooper Mangelson observed Arroyo following
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of
between three and eight car lengths at a speed of
approximately fifty miles per hour. It is noteworthy that Trooper Mangelson had completed his
shift an hour earlier, and was driving home in the
opposite direction from Arroyo when he observed
the alleged traffic violation, one for which .very
few citations are issued.2 Trooper Mangelson did
not stop Arroyo until he had pulled alongside the
truck, and observed that the occupants were
Hispanic, having already noted that Arroyo was
driving a truck with out-of-state license plates.
We agree with the trial judge that the stop was
an unconstitutional pretext to search for drugs.
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for
"following too closely" except for some unartkulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
CONSENT
Our inquiry does not end with the determination
that Trooper Mangelson's stop of Arroyo was
unconstitutional. We must next consider whether
Arroyo's subsequent consent to the search of his
truck purged the taint of the illegal stop thereby
making admissible the cocaine seized. The appropriate inquiry is "'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.'" Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,487-88(1963)).

"The United States Supreme Court has rejected
a *but for9 exclusionary rule for evidence seized
as a result of prior illegality/ Id. (citations
omitted). Thus, even though this evidence would
not have been discovered "but for* the prior
illegal stop, the evidence is not per se inadmissible. Id. Moreover, a search conducted pursuant
to voluntary consent purges the taint from the
prior illegality. Skrn, 754 P Jd at 980 (citing Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 48788 (1963)). Accord United States v. Carson, 793
F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 1986), cert,
denied, 107 S.Ct. 315 (1986); State v. Aquilar,
758 ?J2d 457, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). To
determine whether consent is voluntary, we look
to the totality of the circumstances to see if the
consent was in fact voluntarily given and not ihe
result of "duress or coercion, express or
implied." Sierra, 754 P M at 980 (quoting Scnneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973)). The State bears the burden of proving
that consent was voluntarily given. Siena, 754
PJdat981.
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not contest
the State's argument at the suppression hearing
that he voluntarily consented to the search of his
truck. Arroyo, through his counsel stipulated that
he consented to the search. Arroyo's counsel
objected when the State attempted to offer evidence to establish Arroyo's consent was voluntary,
claiming it was not relevant as the only issue was
whether the original stop was a pretext. As a
result, the trial court limited testimony concerning
the circumstances surrounding Arroyo's consent.
The trial judge specifically found that Arroyo
consented to the search of his truck, and there is
nothing in the record to contradict this finding.
For the first time on appeal, counsel now
argues that Arroyo's consent was not voluntary
as there was no "break in the causal connection
between the illegality and the evidence thereby
obtained." United States v. Recakk, 761 F.2d
1448, 1458 (10th Or. 1985). However, this argument should have been made below. A defendant
cannot mislead the State and the court by stipulating that consent was given, thus preventing the
State from exploring the circumstances of the
consent, and then argue for the first time on
appeal that the consent given was not voluntary.
Based on these circumstances, we conclude that
defendant's stipulation included that the consent
was given voluntarily.
Thus, although the original illegal stop was
unconstitutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary
consent purged the taint from the initial illegality,
and the motion to suppress should not have been
granted.
Accordingly, the order granting Arroyo's
motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and
the case is remanded for trial.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
1. Our analysis is confined to the protections
granted under the Fourth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution rather than article I, section 14
FACTS
of the Utah Constitution. Arroyo attempts to raise
In January 1984, Grant Taylor loaned a sum of
the state constitutional issue as has been encouraged
by our Supreme Court. See, eg., 1) SiMte v. Laff-I money to his brother, plaintiff Wendell Taylor.
eriy, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988); 2) Stare j At the time of the loan, Grant had been divorced
v. Earl 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). However, a I for about one month from his wife of more than
three line conclusory statement as to the greater I forty years, defendant Esther Taylor. On June 30,
scope of state constitutional protections is an insu- I 1984, Grant dictated a document to a second
ffient briefing for us to embark on a state constit- I brother. Nod Taylor, providing that the loan to
utional analysis and we, therefore, refuse to do so. Wendell be forgiven upon Grant's death. Noel
When analyzing state constitutional issues, our typed this document and Grant signed it in the
Supreme Court has cited with approval the approf Nod and Nod's wife, Geraldine.
oach taken in Stare v. Jcwctt, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d presence
Nod then signed the document as a witness and
233(1985).
filed it away. Geraldine did not sign the document
2. Toooper Mangclson testified that he had issued ; at that time.
only three or four citations for 'following too
Shortly after executing the June 30 document,
closely* in 1987.
Grant, who had been ill with cancer, worsened
considerably. On August 30. 1984, he executed a
document entitled 'Last Will and Testament* In
this document. Grant made no provision for his
Cite is
former wife, Esther, nor did he mention the debt
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 36
owed by Wendell or the June 30 document forgiving the debt. The will recited that the bulk of
IN THE
Grant's estate go to a trust, created the same
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
date, in favor of his children.
Grant and Esther remarried on September 21,
Wendell E. Taylor,
1984, approximately ten months after their
Plaintiff and Appellant,
divorce. The trust Grant established on August 30
v.
was immediately amended to include Esther as a
The ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR,
beneficiary. At the time of the remarriage.
deceased, Esther Taylor, Darren G. Taylor,
Grant's cancer had rendered him unable to walk
or speak audibly and he died five days later.
and John Does 1 through 5,
Shortly thereafter, bis estate was informally proDefendants and Respondents.
bated pursuant to the August 30 will.
Following Grant's death, efforts were made to
No. 880136-CA
obtain repayment from Wendell of the money
FILED: February 15, 1989
Grant had loaned him. Unaware of the June 30
document forgiving the debt, Wendell complained
Third District, Salt Lake County
of these efforts to Nod, at which time Nod infHonorable Raymond S. Uno
ormed Wenddl of that document. However, the
ATTORNEYS;
document was not located and delivered to
Wendell until early 1985. In October of that year,
A. Howard Lundgrt
Wendell filed'this action to invalidate the previAppellant
ously probated August 30 document and give
Leland S. McCullough, P. Bryan Fishburn
testamentary effect to the terms of the original
Salt Lake City, for Respondents
June 30 document forgiving repayment of the
loan made by Grant.
.Before Judges Billings, Jackson and Orme
Wenddl claimed that the June 30 document
was actually Grant's last valid will, the August 30
OPINION
document being a product of duress or undue
ORME, Judge:
. influence. Wenddl attached to his complaint a
Wendell Taylor appeals the trial court's entry copy of the June 30 document bearing only the
of summary judgment against him. Wendell signatures of Grant and Nod. Based on the fact
argues that 1) summary judgment was inapprop- that the purported will bore the signature of only
riate due to unresolved issues of material fact one witness, defendants* counsd filed a motion
regarding the validity of his deceased brother's to dismiss Wendell's complaint. Two days before
alleged will; 2) a document favorable to him defendants' motion to dismiss was to be argued,
should be given effect as his brother's will, even Wendell filed an affidavit in which he claimed
though it does not strictly comply with the Utah that the document attached to his complaint was
Probate Code; and 3) the trial court erred in not an accurate copy of the June 30 document.
ordering Wendell to pay a portion of defendants' Attached to his affidavit was another copy of the
attorney fees. We affirm in large part, but document bearing the additional witness signature
remand for reassessment of one aspect of the of Geraldine Taylor. Accordingly, defendants'
court's judgment.
motion to dismiss was continued as it only addressed the validity of a document bearing one
witness signature.
Defendants' counsd promptly deposed Nod
and Geraldine Taylor. Geraldine testified that she
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Utah,
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No, 880062-CA

Jose Francisco Arroyo,
D e i e n d d ill

dim! Respujiidkiinf

• )

This in a titer' is before the c.....:::. upon a Pet I tion for
Rehearing filed by the Respondent.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respom lent .*s P e t i t :i « )i i fi i :
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 22nd day of Match
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m.

the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper.

The vehicle was

headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah.
2.

On the same date, and at the same time, Highway

Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction.
3.

The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or

cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in
the group.

Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two

vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's
vehicle was the rear vehicle.
4.

•

6$&

Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's

vehicle had out of state (California) license plates.
5.

In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a

seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that
said controlled substances are transported in.
6.

Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the

Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics.
7.

Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the

topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or
-2-
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12.

In 1
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Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendants

vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was
•'Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic
code.
13.

When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's

vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin.
14.

Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it

was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license
plate of the front car.

However, the Trooper's denial on this

point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter.

The

Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate
number of the front car in this case.
15.

The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 to

95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in
front of his own.

The Court finds this testimony to be

credible.
16.

In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper

Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a
-4-
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18.

The Trooper requested permission t o search the

D e f e n d a n t ' s vehicle, and 11 :ie De:f:ei idai 11 consei 11:ed t:o 11: Ie seai c h
c-

he v e h i c l e .
39.

Alter searching the camper portion ci v *

Trooper M a n q e l s o n detected
insi dr

tb^i

o pa*"kjje

* '• r-.e passengers ' s door »
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After gaining access to the

inside panel of the passengers/s door, Trooper M a n g e l s o n
removed three bundles containing a p p r o i m <-i t« ly U I H KI lojran of
a wliuU' powder wrapped in due t tape.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now
enters the following:

-5 -

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A stop of an automobile can only be made upon

reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
2.

Trooper Mangelson lacked any reasonable, articulable

suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar.

Instead,

the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin.

Pretext

stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no.
20922 (Utah Dec. 1, 1987).
3.

The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to

conceal his genuine investigative purpose.

Because the stop

of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
4.

All evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's

unlawful detention must be suppressed.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court now enters its:
ORDER
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the
-6-

Del enciant ' >• l i g h t

t.o be f r e e from u n r e a s o n a b l e

searches

seizures under the Vourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Artic.it
I'I nist ) (i.i i. M n i

1 Section M

MI tin nt«jli

M i evidence procured as a result of the

unlawful stop of the Defendant is therefore suppressed.

DATED this _-<j£«?ay ,,l

Approved a s 'tfo form:
DONALD J . EYRE,/a~R~
Juab County A t t o r n e y
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